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ABSTRACT

The focus of this thesis is to explore the legality, the issues, and the remedy to a
controversial statute in the State of Illinois. This thesis will explain how the First Amendment
relates to the Illinois statute and its desire of a citizen is right to report information that is not
being granted. Moreover, this paper will further go into a recent legislative bill to amend the
Illinois statute, its failure, the media surrounding the issue, and the consequences of amending or
not amending the statute. It will further review state law in regard to citizens recording police
officers, and explain how some states deal with the statute.
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Introduction

The term “surveillance” is commonly associated as the act to closely observe another
person or location. In most cases, it is instantly perceived as a positive action in order to maintain
order in a specific place or local. However, many citizens do not think that sometimes recording
can not only be illegal, it can also put them in prison for a very long time.
The first eavesdropping and wiretapping law in Illinois was passed in 1895, it was then
amended in the Criminal Code of 1961. However, despite the laws in regards to eavesdropping
and wiretapping being over one hundred years old, there are still many questions that remain
whether concerning their applicability in criminal trials and civil trials. After reading this
research paper, the reader will understand the legal concepts, issues, and consequences
surrounding the wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes in regards to citizens recording police
officers in all states. Moreover, it will also provide a deep understanding of the history of how
the statutes were first introduced and how they changed, when they changed, and how they
changed with a specific focus on Illinois due to Illinois being the most controversial. The reader
will also understand the consequence of public policy and public response to on-going changes
of the law in that area. Readers will also be able to provide a deep understanding of how the First
Amendment works, and how it protects its citizens.
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I. History

A. The Federal Wiretap Act
The Federal Wiretap Act was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.1 Congress enacted the act as an attempt to construct a balance between law
enforcement and privacy rights,2 as that used to be a rising concern at the time.3
The Federal Wiretap Act under subsection four states the following: “intercept means the
aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through
the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” This means that any intentional
interception of any type of communication can have a punishment of up to five years in prison,
unless an exception can be found. There are many exceptions that can be found in the Act;
however, one of the most noteworthy is the one-party consent exception. Among many
exceptions, one of the most interesting ones is that if one of the parties gives consent, that is
enough in itself to allow the recording to happen without violating the Federal Wiretap Act.4
Another exception is that a face-to-face conversation is permitted as an oral communication only
if there is an expectation of privacy that is reasonable. 5

1

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Federal Wiretap Act) of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat.
197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §2510-22 (2006).
2
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972). “[The Federal Wiretap Act] has its dual purpose (1) protecting
the privacy of wire and oral communications, and. (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and
conditions under which the interception of...communications may be authorized.” Id.
3
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972) “There is...a deep-seated
uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding
citizens.” Id.
4
Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) provides: “It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of
law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one
of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”
5
Id.
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B. States’ Party Consent and the Differences for the Federal Wiretap Act
As of today, there are forty-nine states that have wiretapping statutes that are similar to
the Federal Wiretap Act, Vermont being the only state that does not have any statute in regards to
anti-wiretapping. The main idea behind these wiretapping statutes, much like the Federal Wiretap
Act, is to mirror its predecessor in a way to help combat crime. But it is also focused on
attempting to protect individuals’ privacy rights.6 Thirty-nine of the states have the same oneparty consent exception as the Federal Wiretap Act does, while eleven of those states have what is
called the all-party or two party consent requirement. The states can be appropriately divided in
the two categories:
One Party Consent States:

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
6

Louisiana
Maine
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jeresey

Oregon
Ohio
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

An example is: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §99(A) (2008) which provides:
“The general court finds that organized crime exists within the commonwealth and that
the increasing activities of organized crime constitute a grave danger to the public
welfare and safety... because organized crime carries on its activities through layers of
insulation and behind a wall of secrecy, government has been unsuccessful in curtailing
and eliminating it. Normal investigative procedures are not effective in the investigation
of illegal acts committed by organized crime. Therefore, law enforcement officials must
be permitted to use modern methods of electronic surveillance, under strict judicial
supervision, when investigating these organized criminal activities. The general court
further finds that the uncontrolled development and unrestricted use of modern electronic
surveillance devices pose grave dangers to the privacy of all citizens of the
commonwealth. Therefore, the secret use of such devices by private individuals must be
prohibited.”
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Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma

Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Two or All Party Consent States:
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida

Massachusetts
Maryland
Michigan
Montana

New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Washington

Figure - 1
A typical example of an all-party or two-party consent is that of Pennsylvania, there the
statute reads the following: “shall not be unlawful…for a… person, to intercept a wire, electronic
8

or oral communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such
interception.”7 Pennsylvania does have an expectation of privacy provision as does the federal
statute.

C. Illinois and Massachusetts
Among the all-party consent states, there are two that are exceptionally strict compared to
the others in our nation. The Massachusetts Wiretap Act 8 and the Illinois Eavesdropping Act.
They both, unlike all the other nine all-party consent states, lack the reasonable expectation of
privacy provision. The reasonable expectation of privacy provision protects a face-to-face
against any recording so long as a party has an expectation of privacy that society would
consider reasonable. Illinois and Massachusetts prohibit the recording of a private or non-private
conversation without consent of all parties. Illinois is austere in that it bans all recording without
consent of all parties. In Illinois, recording a police officer is a class 1 felony that can be
punishable by as much as fifteen years in prison.9 On the other hand, Massachusetts is a bit less
severe, as it only prohibits recording made secretly.

1. One Attempt to Change Illinois Statute
In Illinois, December 29, 2011, Representative Elaine Nekritz filed with the clerk an
amendment to the Criminal Code of 1961 to attempt to remove the characterization of recording
police officers who are performing their public duties, in a public place as a criminal act. The bill
was first read into the House Committee on January 1st, 2012, then a second reading and short
7

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5704(4) (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session).
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 §99(B)(4).
9
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/14-2.
8

9

debate took place on February 21st, 2012, and finally a third reading and debate were held in
March 21st, 2012, where the bill finally lost.10 The bill received 45 yeas and 59 nays. 11 A bill that
fails to pass by failing its third reading is “killed,” meaning that it will not be pursued anymore.
However, that is not to say that, despite its failure, the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute will not be
changed in the near future. The proposed amendment was the following:
(q) A person who is not a law enforcement officer nor acting at the direction of a law
enforcement officer may record the conversation of a law enforcement officer who is
performing a public duty in a public place and any other person who is having a
conversation with that law enforcement officer if the conversation is at a volume
audible to the unassisted ear of the person who is making the recording. For purposes
of this subsection (q), "public place" means any place to which the public has access
and includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, and highways (including
inside motor vehicles), and the common areas of public and private facilities and
buildings.12
This amendment did propose a good way to facilitate a citizen to have the right to exercise his
First Amendment right to record a police officer.
During the debate, the side attempting to pass the bill argued that the Illinois statute was
unconstitutional and that there was a movement to change it.13 Furthermore, the bill’s proponents
10

Illinois Legislation House Bill 3944,
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/97/house/09700HB3944_03212012_017000T.pdf
11
Id.
12
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=09700HB3944ham001&GA=97&LegID=62774&SessionId=
84&SpecSess=0&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=3944&GAID=11&Session=.
13
Audio Recording from Illinois House Bill 3944 Debate, 2012.
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explained how the ongoing advances in technology made the statute outdated and how it was too
broad. The other side, however, argued that it was best to wait for the United States Supreme
Court to review ACLU v. Alvarez, so that a higher authority could decide on what was
constitutional and what was not.14 The Supreme Court chose not to hear the case, and, therefore,
the lower court’s decision stands.

2. Massachusetts Unusual Requirement
Unlike the majority of other states, the Massachusetts Wiretap Act does not protect a
conversation made with a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, only “surreptitious
recording” is prohibited. The way the requirement works is that if a recording is made in open
view, then there is no liability because it shows that there is implied knowledge of a recording
taking place. When recording police in a surreptitious way, one can expect to be liable under the
act. A good example is Graber,15 as Graber “did not tell the Troopers he was recording the
encounter nor did he seek their permission to do so.” While this may seem like a technicality,
that is the difference between an arrest and a lawful recording of an incident in Massachusetts.
While this requirement of having the recording out in plain view does seem to fix the
problem of expectation of privacy, there can be cases where the subject who is being recorded,
even though the recording is in plain view, may not notice that he is in fact being recorded in a
conversation or interaction. The requirement does not actually require consent. There is a
difference between presuming that the party is aware of the recording and, therefore, assumes
that he is aware that his privacy has diminished, as opposed to a recording that he has given
14
15

Id.
Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-k-10-647 (Md. Cir. Ct., Harford Cnty., Sept. 27, 2010)
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consent to and is aware for a fact that he no longer has privacy. In Glik,16 we see that the court
sees that any device known to record audio is on its own enough to show the subject’s actual
knowledge of the recording. Massachusetts’ unusual provision tends to be quite different than
attempting to say that there is a provision that functions the same way as the exception noted by
other states of reasonable expectation of privacy. There are plenty of scenarios where one could
have a recording in open view, yet the subject has not actually seen or realized that his
expectation of privacy is diminished because of it. Moreover, recent changes in technology
could also pose a problem to the Massachusetts Wiretap statute. Because smartphones have
several different functions, such as text messaging, mobile web, and more, it may be
problematic for an individual to know that his expectation of privacy has been diminished
because there is a smartphone in his presence and that he could be recorded. Other situations
that could lead to a problem with this provision in Massachusetts are shown through Glik,17
where Glik was recording a police officer in a public place where the police officer had no
expectation of privacy, but Glik was arrested nonetheless for recording in a way that was
considered surreptitious. Courts in Massachusetts because of this requirement will often have to
ask the question of whether a recording was made in secret or not, and that will be the
difference between a lawful recording and an unlawful one. Ultimately, this provision leads to a
limit being set as to what the First Amendment right to gather and report information imposes.

16
17

Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011)
Id.
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D. Right to Privacy and Katz
Most if not all Americans are familiar with their right to privacy. However, when
searching in the Constitution for the word “privacy,” one will soon notice that it cannot be
found anywhere.18 When issues of privacy first emerged, it was noted that while the word
“privacy” was not in the Constitution; when reading the Constitution as a whole, you could
understand that the notion of privacy, while not in words, was there in theory and function.19
It has been clear that the drafters of the Constitution were always looking for citizens to have
a right to privacy when looking at the Amendments as a whole.

1. Katz v. United States
The first case to emerge that dealt with the right to privacy was Katz.20 Surprisingly at the
time, it was held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone booth
conversations.21 The Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment “protects people
not places”22 and that decision led to the overturn of Olmstead.23 In Olmstead, the court held
that based on the language of the Fourth Amendment, police tapping telephone wires was not
considered a search or seizure.24 This rationale demonstrated that citizens at the time lack
expectation of privacy. With Katz, a modern test developed to evaluate if someone was or
would violate a citizen’s right. The test was divided into a two-pronged approach25 the first

18

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1, 2 (2008).
Id.
20
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 353.
23
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-70 (1928).
24
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 354(1967).
25
Id. at 360-63.
19
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prong was that the person alleging the violation must have a subjective expectation of privacy.
It is easier to understand this approach after looking at Smith,26 where the court held that there
was no expectation of privacy when a police officer used a pen to capture numbers dialed into
a telephone. The second prong was that the expectation of privacy must be one that society is
willing to consider objectively reasonable. Again, looking at Smith27 will provide a better
understanding of this concept. In Smith the court held that it would be unreasonable for the
person taping the call to have an expectation of privacy in the number called because the
dialed numbers are transmitted to the phone company when a call is connected.

E. First Amendment Right to Receive Information
The First Amendment provides several rights, one of them being free speech. However,
there cannot be free speech if it is impossible to gather or receive the information. If one
cannot access the speech, that speech is not free at all, at least that is the reasoning that the
United States Supreme Court developed in Martin v. Struthers28 where it developed a theory
that there was in fact a constitutional right under the First Amendment to receive information
using the noted reasoning above.
The right to receive information has gone through a lot of changes in the past, and
expanded its use to something that was once considered peripheral and much less secure to
something much broader. In the past, a common dispute was whether one was allowed to
receive information in a library setting. Board of Education v. Pico29 was the first Supreme

26

Smith v. Maryland - 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
Id. at 742.
28
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
29
Board of Education v. Pico, 57 U.S. 853 (1982).
27
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Court case to consider it a necessary right to receive the information under the First
Amendment. However, because the Justices were unable to reach a direct and common
consensus, the divided opinions left a fractured jurisprudence.
While Pico was a case about school books, it also was a base for later cases on issues of
receiving information. The case involved a school board’s removal of a book from a public
school library. Justice Brennan wrote at the time, “courts should not intervene in the resolution
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems unless basic constitutional
values are directly and sharply implicated.” 30 However, the right to receive information did
implicate the students’ right under the First Amendment.
The court further reasoned that, “the right to receive information is an inherent corollary
of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, in two
senses. First, the right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender’s First Amendment
right to send them.” Furthermore, the Justice concluded and I quote, “the right to receive ideas
is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech,
press, and political freedom.”31 The same principle could be applied to videos, recordings, or
both. While it is true that the principle of receiving ideas started off with just books, this has
evolved so much to the point where the ACLU is argument depended on the notion of
receiving information, in that case, of a police officer, to be a right protected under the First
Amendment.

30
31

Id. at 856.
Id. at 867.
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F. Cases Exploring the Issues with Some All-Party Consent States
There have been quite a few cases that have challenged the all-party states wiretapping laws
with regards to citizens recording police officers. Most of the cases, the issue most attorneys
pressed was that the statute violates the First Amendment. The argument they make is that as an
individual, you are allowed to record police officers acting in their official capacities.32 Citizens
are often arrested subsequently after recording police officers; the following cases will illustrate
how statutory language facilitated their arrest. They will also show the need for having an
exception such as the one provided in the Federal Wiretap Act.

1. Glik v. Cunniffe33
Simon Glik was walking through Boston on an evening in October 1st, 2009. As he walked
down the streets he noticed three police officers arresting a man. As Glik was passing by, he
heard another person saying “You are hurting him, stop.” 34 As soon as Glik heard the man, he
took out his cell phone and started recording the encounter, standing about ten feet away. After
the police officer placed the subject in handcuffs, one of them turned to Glik and stated, “I think
you have taken enough pictures.” In response, Glik said that he was recording audio as well, and
that is when he was immediately placed under arrest. Glik was then taken to the police station,
without knowing what he had done wrong; later he found out that he was being charged with
violating the Massachusetts Wiretap Act 35 and also charged with disturbing the peace and aiding

Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “The First Amendment protects the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of
public interest.” Id.
33
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
34
Id.
35
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272 §99(C)(1) (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session).
32
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the escape of a prisoner. His cell phone and computer flash drive were then held as evidence.
The Boston Municipal Court dismissed two of the counts, and dropped the charge of aiding in
escape before trial. The court noted that there was no probable cause and that the officers were
simply unhappy that they were being recorded by Glik. 36 Glik then filed a complaint against the
arresting officer and the City of Boston, claiming violations of his First and Fourth Amendment
rights.37
The First Circuit held in regards to his First Amendment claim, that there was a right to
film government officials as long as they were doing their duties in a public place; this included
police officers doing their job.38 As the court reasoned, “First Amendment protects the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to
record matters of public interest.”39 The court addressed some of the factors that have to be taken
into account as to any First Amendment issue, the place, time, and manner. Glik’s recording was
clearly protected by his constitutional right, as it was a recording in a public park and that he was
also acting in a peaceful manner.
As to his Fourth Amendment claim, the court reasoned that there was a lack of probable
cause for placing Glik under arrest. The court upon review of Massachusetts’ Wiretap Act, also
noted that “conduct fell plainly outside the type of clandestine recording targeted by the wiretap
statute” because Glik had his phone out, and was recording in a way that was open and nonsecretive. The police officers attempted to argue how having the cell-phone out was different
than having a tape recorder, and that, because a cell-phone can have multiple functions, they
36

Daniel Rowinski, POLICE FIGHT CELLPHONE RECORDINGS, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010 at 12.
655 F.3d at 79.
38
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir., 2000).
39
Id.
37
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were unable to know that it was in fact recording. The court, however, did not agree with the
police officer’s argument and said that the other functions of the phone were irrelevant as to
whether the recording was being made secretly as is required to be in violation of the
Massachusetts Wiretap Act.40 That reasoning was the same as it was previously seen under
Commonwealth v. Hyde. 41 In that case, the court explained that a recording is not secret if the
instrument or device for the recording is held in plain sight.
2. Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle42
In Pennsylvania 2007, Brian Kelly took a ride from a pick-up truck driver. As they were
driving, a police officer stopped them for a traffic stop. As the police officer approached their
vehicle, Kelly took out his video camera and put it in his lap set to record the encounter. As the
officer was about to leave, he noticed Kelly’s video camera recording him.43 The police officer
went on to place him under arrest under the assumption that he had violated the Pennsylvania
Wiretapping Act and Electronic Surveillance Control Act,44 a felony in third degree that can be
punishable to up to seven years in prison. As bail was set for $2,500, and that was too much for
Kelly, so stayed locked in jail for twenty-seven hours; after that he was released thanks to his
Mother for putting her house up as a security deposit.45
Charges against Kelly were dropped a month after, and it was then noted that the
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act might have to be reviewed for possible amendments. As District
Attorney David Freed stated himself, “When police are audio-and video-recording traffic stops
40

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272 §99(B)(4)
Commonwealth v. Hyde 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001)
42
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 251 (3d Cir. 2010).
43
Id.
44
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §5704 (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session)..
45
Matt Miller, WIRETAP CHARGE DROPPED IN POLICE VIDEO CASE, THE PATRIOT NEWS, June 21, 2007, at 23.
41
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without notice to the subjects, similar actions by citizens, even if done in secret, will not result
in criminal charges. I intend to communicate this decision to all police agencies so that officers
on the street are better-prepared to handle a similar situation should it arise again.” And when
asked about the wiretap statute as to what he thought about it, he responded, “It is not the
clearest statute that we have on the books, it could need a look, based on how technology has
advanced since it was written.”46 After Kelly was released, he filed a complaint against the
Borough of Carlisle under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His argument was not surprisingly based on a
violation of his First Amendment rights.47 However, this case was set before Glik, and the court
ruled differently. It granted summary judgment in favor of the police officer, and found that
videotaping a police officer was not a clearly established right under the First Amendment, at
least not on those facts. The court reminded Kelly that the facts in this case, were based on a
traffic stop, which can be “an inherently dangerous situation,” and because the First
Amendment right is dependent on time, place, and manner restrictions, the right to record was
not absolute. Therefore, the court granted the officers qualified immunity and Kelly’s case was
then dismissed.
3. Maryland v. Graber48
In Maryland on March 2010, a man named Graber was riding his motorcycle on the
highway, as he was stopped by a police officer in an unmarked vehicle.49 The police officer was
not wearing his uniform, and his vehicle was a normal sedan; however, as he exited the vehicle,
he pulled out his gun and yelled at Graber to get off his bike. He was going to cite Graber for
46

Id.
622 F.3d at 251.
48
Maryland v. Graber, No. 12-k-10-647 (Md. Cir. Ct., Harford Cnty., Sept. 27, 2010).
49
Id.
47
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speeding and reckless driving, but during the stop, Graber’s helmet camera, one he uses usually
record him riding, was also recording this whole encounter.50 A video was posted a week after
on YouTube, with the whole footage of the encounter. A month after the video was posted, six
police officers went to Graber’s house where, with a search warrant, they searched Graber’s
parents’ house for 90 minutes; there they confiscated four computers, the camera helmet,
external hard drives and thumb drives.51 Shortly after taking the noted items, Graber was placed
under arrest, and was in jail for twenty-six hours. He was charged with violating the Maryland
Wiretap Act, a felony punishable by up to five years in prison, a $10,000 fine, or both.52 Soon
after he was released, Graber’s motion to dismiss was granted after the court reasoned that
Graber’s conversation with the police officer they had no reasonable expectation of privacy,
therefore; the recording did not violate the Maryland Wiretap Act.

4. Smith v. City of Cumming53
James Smith filed a suit against the City of Cumming, Georgia alleging that the City
police officer had harassed the Smiths, which suit also included a claim that Mr. Smith had not
been able to videotape the police officer in violation of Smith’s First Amendment rights.54 The
court reasoned that it did agree that Smith did have a First Amendment right to videotape police
conduct as long as reasonable time, manner and place restrictions did apply, and especially the
right to do so if the recording would be a matter of public interest. While it was true that the
Smiths did have the right to record the police officers, they still had to prove that they were
50

Id.
Id.
52
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §10-402(a)(1) (West, Westlaw Through End of the 2012 Regular Session).
53
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332(11th Cir. 2000).
54
Id.
51
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deprived of such a right. And though, the Smiths did have the right to videotape them, the court
could not find enough evidence to find that they were deprived of their right to record the police
officer in their encounter.
5. Robinson v. Fetterman55
In Pennsylvania on June 20, 2000, Robinson was driving by Route 41 when he saw state
troopers conducting truck inspections. He believed at the time that the manner in which those
inspections were made was not safe. Because of this belief, Robinson gained authorization
from a landowner on the northbound side of Route 41 to be able to videotape inspections done
by state troopers. From that point on, Robinson began to videotape inspections, one of which
was of officer Fetterman and Rigney from roughly 30 feet away. Officers Fetterman and
Rigney noticed the recording, and placed Robinson under arrest for harassment.56 On August
28, 2000, Robinson was then convicted of harassment, had to pay a fine, and was told to not go
near the state troopers while they were performing their duties.
Two years passed by and Robinson’s wife as she was driving on Route 41 almost got into
an accident, mostly due to the congestion of the state troopers’ placement of the truck
inspection. Robinson immediately thought the state troopers were conducting these inspections
in an unsafe manner, and, because of that, he decided to videotape them. He gained the
permission of a farm owner to conduct his recordings, in which he positioned himself about 20
to 30 feet away from the highway. Later that day, as a state trooper was inspecting a truck, he
noticed Robinson, and asked him for identification and if he had the permission from the
owner to record roadway police officer; Robinson affirmed, and the state trooper continued to
55
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do his duty. That same state trooper then advised his fellow trooper, Fetterman, about
Robinson’s conduct, and Fetterman remembered Robinson from the past case where Robinson
was convicted of harassment.57
Later on that same day, Fetterman, Rigney, and the other state trooper entered the farm
where Robinson was videotaping the road, and asked him to stop videotaping them, and to leave
the area. After Robinson refused to leave or stop videotaping, he was then placed under arrest.
He was again charged with harassment58 but had his video-camera returned to him by the time he
received his citation.59 He was later found guilty again of harassment; however, this time he
appealed the conviction, alleging a violation of his right to free speech under the First
Amendment, pointing out specifically, his right to “videotape state troopers and thus speak out
on issues of public concern.”60 The court reasoned that indeed there was a right under the First
Amendment to record the state troopers, as he was doing so to make a visual record of what he
believed to be an unsafe manner in which they were performing their duties. The court ruled that
there is a free speech right to record police officers while they perform their duties.61
6. Illinois v. Allison62
Allison was openly recording a police officer on his own property, when he was arrested
for violating the Illinois Wiretap Act.63 After that, he was then recording his hearing at the
Crawford County Courthouse, where he answered Judge Harrell’s question as to whether he had
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a pocket recorder at his hearing, Judge Harrell then told him that “violated her right to
privacy.”64 Allison was then charged with five counts of wiretapping, each punishable by four to
15 years in prison. Two months later, Allison filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of probable
cause.65 However, Allison, instead of focusing on his charges, concentrated specifically on the
Illinois Wiretap Act, unlike past cases.66 The motion focused on the following arguments:
vagueness, due process, and the First Amendment. The court did grant Allison’s motion to
dismiss, in which Judge Frankland held for the first time that the Illinois Act did violate the
First Amendment as it stood as flawed by lack of exceptions and served as a blanket rule as it
had no limitations as required by the First Amendment such as time, place, or manner. The
court grant Allison is motion to dismiss.67
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7. ACLU v. Alvarez68
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed this complaint against Anita Alvarez
in her official capacity as Cook County state’s attorney. The ACLU was seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief as to the application of the Illinois Wiretap Act.69 Its motion was dismissed
by the district court, and the ACLU then filed an appeal, arguing the First Amendment provided
protection to speech regarding government officials and matters of public concern.
In September 2011, oral arguments were held in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Illinois. Judge Posner expressed his concern that when recordings are allowed, there will be “a
lot more snooping around by reporters and bloggers,”70 pointing out as that being a bad thing
because it would conflict with their privacy. However, it seems that argument was made with no
basis in logic, because police-on-civilian audio recording does not undermine privacy, but
civilian-on-police audio recording would.
Several months later, on May 8, 2012, the court reached a decision, finding that the
Illinois Wiretapping Act did violate the First Amendment, and granted a preliminary injunction
blocking the enforcement of the statute as applied to civilians on police officers recordings.71
The court reasoned that the wording of the statute as too broad, as it did not include a provision
for a reasonable expectation of privacy under statute.
On November 26, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving in place the
appellate court’s injunction against the use of the statute prohibiting civilian recording of police.
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Thus it, clearly decided that the First Amendment does protect an individual’s is right to openly
record a police officer.72

G. Lower Expectation of Privacy
Unlike other American citizens, courts have often found that police officers have a lower
expectation of privacy. For example, in O’Brian,73 the court concluded that it was mandatory
for the officer to disclose financial records did not violate the police officer’s privacy right,
because police officers are held to a higher standard of accountability and, because of that, a
lessened privacy expectation.74
Another concept that also impacts a police officer’s expectation of privacy is the open
field doctrine. Basically, the doctrine is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy if
something is left in view of the public, or exposed to the public.75 If police officers’ conduct
their duties exposed to the public, some courts have interestingly thought that officers have
lower expectation of privacy.76
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II. Analysis

A. Police Misconduct
One of the most critical reasons to amend the statute is so citizens could have a way to
check if police officers are acting properly. Citizens have not forgotten the incident with Rodney
King. On March 2nd, 1991, Rodney King and two other passengers were in a vehicle driving off
Foothill Interstate. Rodney King, the driver at the time, was speeding at about 110 mph. Police
officers started to chase his vehicle until he decided to stop. The police officers then, started to
beat Rodney King for about fifteen minutes; meanwhile they were being secretly recorded by a
citizen.77 These are fifteen minutes that may have never been known, if not for a citizen’s
recording of the police officers. It will be long before citizens forget those recordings, and the
prohibition against being able to record police officers could lead citizens to feel as if more
events such as the involving Rodney King could go unnoticed.

B. Support For Illinois’ Statute
Despite its controversy, there is support for the statute. Some police officers believe the
statute allows them to perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently. Others believe the
contrary. Sheriff Bennie Vick of Williamson County Illinois articulated, “Someone coming up
shoving a camera in your face...I can see how that would endanger lives.”78 Others argue that
informants could be facing higher risks if a citizen decided to record an interaction between an
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undercover police officer and the informant and that video was later to be found on YouTube.
As such, it could cause a police investigation to fail when the investigation is exposed
prematurely. While certainly there are many risks, there are also numerous reasons why the
Illinois statute should be amended.

C. Civilian Use of New Technology
We have come a long way from the old cellphone that used look like a brick, to the new
generation smart phone, a computer in your pocket. Not surprisingly, smart phones can record
videos and take pictures, and the power of a citizen to record anything, at any time can lead
citizen to be his or her own news reporter. Those recordings can now be easily accessed through
social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.79 It is estimated that 90
percent of cellphones in the United States have a cellphone that accesses the Web.80 The use of
smart phones and other digital cameras has been growing at a very quick rate. In 2009, 78
percent of U.S. households owned a digital camera.81 Not only are most households with digital
cameras; more than a billion cellphones are equipped with cameras.82 In contrast, a cellphone or
a digital camera is sold today for a fraction of price that it used to cost in the past.83
While this new technology comes with many benefits, now citizens can record police
misconduct at sight whenever needed. That will add pressure on police officers to conduct their
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duties in a civilized and disciplined way. Moreover, police officers that are being falsely accused
of bad conduct can be protected through the use of recordings. As the court in ACLU v. Alvarez84
said, “Civilian recordings of police can help resolve police-civilian factual disputes regarding,
for example, threats, verbal abuse, racial harassment, whether an officer Mirandized a civilian
before interrogating him, whether police encouraged one civilian to threaten another, and
whether force was excessive.” It is unquestionable that a recording of an encounter can provide
many benefits to police officers. Usual testimonial problems that are always an issue in court are
simply gone as long as the recording is admitted. For example, a police officer’s testimony may
fall or the officer is being accused of the testimony falling under any of those categories: (1)
Faulty memory; (2) Bias; and (3) Any misstatement as to how the incident took place.
A video recording could fix all of those issues by showing what actually took place, and
it would help the jury reach an unbiased decision based on the incident itself; if a photo is worth
a thousand words, a recording is worth a million. Recordings like that have already helped
numerous officers to be exonerated from allegations of misconduct.85 Recordings of police
officers can also help educate other police officials on how to deal with specific situations; a
recording can show the inexperienced police officer how to properly deal with a unique situation.
While we see how there are many benefits of having better technology, there are also
matters that citizens need to be careful of when it comes to new technology. The ACLU has
invented an application for smart phones to secretly record police officers. The application called
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“Police Tape”86 can lead to problems with the current laws of today. For example, if a citizen
uses the application to record an encounter with a police officer in Massachusetts, that could lead
to an arrest87 as it is illegal to secretly record a police officer; by the same token, it is legal to
record a police officer in an indiscreet way.

D. Police Officer’s Expectation of Privacy
As previously noted in Katz, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against state and
federal actors, but the Fourth Amendment does little to protect police officers, and an expectation
of privacy provided to citizens, is often not found for police officers.88 States such as
Massachusetts that do not provide an expectation of privacy exception, might want to consider
defining expectation of privacy for both citizens and police officers. That way, with the rising
number cases which citizens record police officers, there will not be an issue when those rights
are violated.
In O’Brien v. DiGrazia89, the courts when questioned with the issue of whether police
officers’ expectation of privacy or the public interested should outweigh each other found that
the public interest was more important than a police officer’s expectation of privacy. It is a
known fact that reducing privacy holds police officers more accountable, and that is one of the
factors that is necessary to protect the public against illegitimate exercise of power.90
Besides the first issue, there is also the concern of what are the circumstances that give
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rise to this expectation of privacy of police officers and if they in fact should even possess such a
right. This focus in changing language to appropriately define to whom the expectation of
privacy may be granted should mainly focus in states where there is an all-party consent like
Massachusetts.

E. Illinois Lack of Privacy Provision
Illinois is the only state that considers it a crime to record conversations regardless of
privacy expectations.91 Illinois also requires all parties consent to record.92There is no concrete
theory of an expectation of privacy in Illinois, as it acts without any subjective or objective
expectation of privacy. Unlike Massachusetts, Illinois also disregards whether the recording was
made in the secretly or out in the open. All in all, the only possible way to not violate the Illinois
Wiretap Act is to have the consent of all parties to the recording, regardless of where you are.
This can prove to be a difficult task when conducting recordings in an open park, or places with
several people. For example, if someone is at a stadium filled with fans and players, technically,
that person would have to gather the consent from every single person that is attending the event,
and that is playing. It is clear to see how the Illinois Wiretap Act is problematic, as it is too strict,
and at the same time, too broad in its statutory language without providing an expectation of
privacy that all citizens deserve. Moreover, the Act misses the point and direction for which the
statute was created; while making it a requirement to have all parties consent, it makes it almost
impossible in several different occasions to have a lawful recording. 93 The Illinois court’s intent
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had at its core the desire to “protect individuals from unwarranted invasions of privacy…. and
safeguard citizens from unnecessary governmental surveillance.”94 But instead, it is
criminalizing as a felony. The action of a number of innocent people whose conduct has no
bearing on any privacy expectation.
With the Supreme Court’s decision in ACLU v. Alvarez to uphold the lower court’s95
decision, it is very likely that we will see a new amendment to the Illinois Wiretap Act, one that
serves as it was intended, to protect its citizens from unnecessary governmental surveillance.
One good example is in Graber, where Graber was recording a police officer in an area that there
would be no reasonable expectation of privacy; however, because Illinois is so strict in its
consent requirement, it led to an arrest that would have not happened in any other state. Another
example, in Allison, the incident happened in circumstances in which there would be no
expectation of privacy; it was an open recording of police officers on duty on a civilian’s
property, and the hearing took place in a busy courthouse. 96 Again, because Allison never
acquired their consent, this conduct was considered a crime that would be lawful in any other
state, aside from Massachusetts.

F. The Need for a Privacy Provision
Illinois and Massachusetts Wiretapping statutes are stricter than the wiretapping statutes of
any other state. Still, both of those statutes were made with the intent to protect private citizens
from state actors and other citizens.97The intent was never to prosecute citizens recording police
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officers.98 Both of those states could be accomplishing their original intent for if they provided
provision for a conversation made with a reasonable expectation of privacy. In cases like Graber,
Allison, and Hyde, to name a few, there would be no violation the police officer recording would
not be prohibited because it will not have the been made with a reasonable expectation of privacy
– as contained in the Federal Act. The ability to record police officers should be allowed, as the
First Amendment allows the ability to gather information, and deliver information. This
information that can be crucial in cases such as the one involving Rodney King. A police officer
should not be shielded from recordings, as there is an ongoing need to monitor police officers
and hold them accountable for their actions. Therefore, by allowing recording when a reasonable
expectation of privacy does not exist, citizens will be able to record on-duty officers in public,
the recording would not conflict with police officers’ investigations because they would only be
recorded in settings where there is not an expectation of privacy.
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III. Proposal
Consumer technology is always advancing, and the legal issues in states like
Massachusetts and Illinois need to be looked at by both legislatures and the courts. There are
numerous ways that the statutes from Massachusetts and Illinois that lack of an expectation
privacy language can be dealt with to not be unconstitutional.
A clear solution would be to simply amend the statute to protect only those face-to-face
conversations made with a reasonable expectation of privacy similar to the Federal Wiretap
Act. Including such a provision would be the easiest way to fix any issues surrounding those
statutes – as the other states do not have such a problem with those statutes. By doing so, there
would no conflict citizens’ rights. Police officers would still be able to conduct investigations
as they deem necessary without risking premature investigations to be aborted because of
unwanted recordings, since all recordings would happen in a public place, where a police
officer would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the first place. It would also grant
citizens the ability to monitor police activity, so that there is a lesser incidence of police
misconduct. This would also be beneficial to police officers as they would be able to also use
recordings in their advantage when faced with false allegations by citizens. The court system
would also benefit from this, as an accurate recording would save court is time, and lead to a
fair and correct judgment in cases of which there is a recording.
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